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I. INTRODUCTION - MILITARY NECESSITY  
 3 
The concept of military necessity is of fundamental importance for International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Criminal Law (ICL) and International 
Law, generally.  States and individuals have used military necessity as a 
justification when extraordinary situations “require the adoption of measures 
departing from the normally applicable law in order to protect basic values and 
fundamental interests.”1  Measures adopted on the grounds of necessity have 
been accepted at international law by international courts and tribunals, state 
practice, and international legal doctrine. 
 
This paper will analyse and explain the origins of military necessity under IHL, 
and how military necessity’s use has developed and influenced the behaviour of 
actors at international law, primarily during times of armed conflict.  
Furthermore, this paper will seek to establish the role that military necessity 
plays at ICL.  This will be done by analysing various case law examples of 
international tribunals where the tribunals have been asked to determine 
whether military necessity constituted a legitimate justification for a particular 
course of action taken by an individual, primarily in positions of command.  This 
paper will highlight the circumstances where a legitimate finding of military 
necessity existed, and will contrast this to occasion where actions did not meet 
the required threshold.  It will also seek to determine how military necessity is 
interpreted and understood by various international organisations such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the United Nations (UN), and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
 
The paper will begin with by providing an overview of the origins of military 
necessity under IHL and how it has evolved in its interpretation and usage by 




II. NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
                                                        
1 Tarcisio Gazzini, Wouter G. Werner and Ige F. Dekker “Necessity Across International Law: An 
Introduction” (2010) NYIL 41 at 3. 
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Necessity generally is a central principle of international law.  It is a “source of 
international rules[,] a condition for the application of certain … rules as well as 
a  circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of certain acts.”2 Necessity, and 
specifically military necessity exist as a justification for actions that would 
otherwise be considered unlawful. 
 
Under IHL, the starting point is based upon the premise that there is an armed 
conflict.  IHL seeks to regulate armed conflict and “[w]hatever restraints the law 
imposes must accommodate [those restraints] to military necessity and regulate 
around its edges.”3 This emphasises the point that terrible actions occur during 
times of war, and the laws of war “can only … shrink [those terrible actions] to 
what is necessary[.]”4 
 
A. Origins of Military Necessity - Treaty Law and Customary 
International Law 
Military necessity as a principle of armed conflict dates back to the mid 19th 
century following Henry Dunant’s publication of Un Souvenir de Solferino, which 
inspired the establishment of the ICRC.  However, the first official codification of 
the modern laws of war was promulgated by the United States during the 
American Civil War. 
 
The Lieber Code5 provides an early example of the importance of military 
necessity and how it influences the actions of forces during an armed conflict. 
The code explicitly states that “[m]ilitary necessity … consists in the necessity of 
those measures which are indispensible for securing the ends of the war, and 
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”6 Crucially, the 
Lieber Code accepts the need for actions that are intended to achieve the 
necessary goals and objectives of war, but seeks to ensure war is conducted with 
                                                        
2 Nicholas Tsagourias “Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime” (2010) NYIL 41 at 12. 
3 David Luban “Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law” (2013) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 26 at 323. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code) 24 
April 1863. 
6 Art 14, Lieber Code. 
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adherence to the legal conduct of war, and to act out of military necessity to 
achieve legitimate objectives. 
 
Two sets of treaties, the Hague Treaty and the Geneva Convention, establish the 
core principles of IHL, including military necessity.  These treaties impose a 
range of requirements and obligations upon parties that have ratified them.  The 
Hague Treaties “sought to limit the tactics of war and prohibit the use of certain 
weapons that cause excessive suffering”7 Specifically, Hague Convention IV 
refers to the necessity of warfare with the “desire to diminish the evils of war, as 
far as military requirements permit[.]” 8  Additionally, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva established a number of protections for 
people who are impacted by war, especially for those who do not directly 
participate in a conflict.  These make up the treaties known as the Geneva 
Conventions.   
 
The Geneva Convention Additional Protocols  (AP) I and II help to further 
expand upon the requirements of military necessity under IHL.  AP I9 eludes to 
the principle of military necessity under two main Articles.  On the protection of 
the civilian population, AP I prohibits indiscriminate attacks by armed forces 
against civilians.10 The requirements to determine whether there is military 
necessity for an attack can also be determined under AP I, which states that 
indiscriminate attacks are prohibited if it is considered that such an attack  “may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”11 AP I also imposes 
requirements upon States to take precautions in the conduct of military 
operations.  If before an attack takes place “it becomes apparent that the 
objective is not a military one … or that the attack may be expected to cause 
                                                        
7Beth Van Schaack & Kelly Madigan “Volume 2: International Criminal Law” (2014) International 
Humanitarian Law Teaching Supplement, Emroy International Humanitarian Law Clinic at 2. 
8 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 1977. 
10 Ibid, Art 51(4). 
11 Above, n 8, Art 51(5)(b). 
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incidental loss of civilian life … which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated[.]”12 Although articles 51 and 
57 do not refer explicitly to the principle of military necessity, it is clear that a 
key parameter of military necessity exists in relation to the protection of 
civilians during an armed conflict.  If it is considered that an attack may cause 
loss of civilian life that would be disproportionate to the military objective, it is 
arguable that this imposes a clear restriction on military necessity as a 
justification for action. 
 
AP II provides additional restrictions on the application of military necessity and 
helps to define its parameters of applicability. Article 15 seeks to protect works 
and installations containing dangerous forces, such as dams, dykes and nuclear 
power stations by ensuring that such installations are not the object of attack  “if 
such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe 
losses among the civilian population.”13 It is clear that under AP II, the High 
Contracting Parties of AP II agreed that installations such as dams and nuclear 
power stations were to be the object of a military attack, the risk to the civilian 
population would outweigh any military benefit and places a further 
requirement on the use of military necessity as a justifying principle for military 
action. 
 
B. Military Necessity and IHL 
To assist with the understanding of what constitutes military necessity, a 
number of authors have written and provided interpretation of the various 
requirements of military necessity.    
 
Writing after the World War II war crime trials, N.C.H. Dunbar argued there 
were three distinct categories of military necessity.  The first category, he 
argued, proscribed “indirectly, what might otherwise constitute lawful acts of 
warfare by laying down the principle that ‘no more force, no greater violence, 
should be used to carry out an operation than is absolutely necessary in the 
                                                        
12 Above, n 8 Art 57(2)(b). 
13 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of  Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977, Art 15. 
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particular circumstances’.”14 The second category of military necessity is made 
up of “rules by which State parties have specifically limited the circumstances in 
which military necessity is applicable.”15 This category relates to the Hague 
Treaties and Geneva Conventions and the specific prohibition on certain military 
activities unless determined to be absolutely militarily necessary.  The third and 
final category, according to Dunbar, will be discussed later in this paper but 
highlights the “use of military necessity as an affirmative defense to war 
crimes.”16 
 
However, when considering military necessity in the context of the early 21st 
century B J Bill suggests that it is inappropriate to describe military necessity as 
a specific rule of armed conflict, but rather a basic, and general rule of IHL.  He 
argues military necessity “permeates all subsidiary rules [of the laws of war].”17  
Instead, the focus on the application of military necessity should be to what 
extent it is has become part of particular rules of warfare.  These other rules of 
warfare, according to Bill, demonstrate that military necessity is not prescribed 
a specific standard by the law of war and merely “offers a weak independent 
constraint at best.”18 Furthermore, when analysing the rules related to the 
means and methods of warfare “almost all the rules are stated as prohibitions, 
many of which contain military necessity exceptions[.]”19 It is possible to suggest 
that based on Bill’s reasoning, military necessity constitutes a vital part of IHL, 
but one that must be carefully considered in conjunction with specific rules, such 
as the treatment of prisoners of war and non-combatants. 
 
Following post World War II pleadings by individuals charged for war crimes of 
military necessity as a general justification for violating IHL, “there has been a 
wide consensus that military necessity cannot justify conduct which disregards a 
                                                        
14 N.C.H. Dunbar “Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials” [1952] 29 BYIL (1952). 
15 B J Bill “The Rendlic ‘Rule’: Military Necessity, Commander’s Knowledge, and Methods of 
Warfare” (2009) YIHL 12 at 129. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Above, n 15 at 131. 
18 Above, n 15 at 132. 
19 Above, n 15 at 133. 
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positive rule of law or which goes beyond its express limitations.”20 This 
arguably imposes a requirement that military necessity is interpreted as 
narrowly as possible.  
 
III. MILITARY NECESSITY - INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS’ 
INTERPRETATION 
As a result of the important role that military necessity plays in the actions of 
combatants during an armed conflict, a number of international organisations 
have in various ways provided insight into the status of military necessity today.   
 
C. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
The ICRC’s publication, Handbook on International Rules Governing Military 
Operations21 collects summaries of what the ICRC considers to be the most 
important provisions of the law of armed conflict.  It defines the law of armed 
conflict, or IHL, as a set of rules “which seek, for humanitarian reasons to limit 
the effects of armed conflict.”22 This statement clearly emphasises and reflects 
the ICRC’s mission and purpose of ensuring humanitarian protection and 
assistance for victims of armed conflict.  The ICRC’s interpretation of the rules of 
armed conflict show that they are intended to “strike a balance between 
considerations of military necessity and the requirements of humanity.”23  
Furthermore, the ICRC’s view of military necessity, unsurprisingly, reflects 
closely the language of treaties on the subject.  Military necessity as defined by 
the ICRC, and taken from Treaty law is as follows: 
The principle of military necessity permits measures which are actually necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by the law of 
armed conflict.  In the case of an armed conflict the only legitimate military purpose is to 
weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the conflict.24 
                                                        
20 William Gerald Downey Jr “The Law of War and Military Necessity” (1953) 47(2) AJIL 251 at 
262. 
21 International Committee of the Red Cross “Handbook on International Rules Governing 
Military Operations” ICRC, December 2013. 
22 Ibid at 47. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Above, n 21 at 54. 
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This is a very narrow interpretation of the role that military necessity plays in 
IHL, but it represents the very concise and principled approach adopted by the 
ICRC. 
 
D. The United Nations 
Military necessity’s position in international law and IHL can also be understood 
by analysing the United Nations (UN) position.  The United Nations Infantry 
Battalion Manual provides specific guidance to battalion commanders and their 
staff highlighting how the planning and conduct of operations during 
peacekeeping operations should be executed in line with a UN mandate.  
Interestingly, the Manual makes no reference of military necessity, but instead 
refers to ‘operational necessities’. 
 
Despite developments since the late 20th century, the UN’s report on State 
responsibility further shows how the UN views military necessity under 
international law.  Mr Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, provides valuable 
insight into what constitutes a state of necessity in international law.  Mr Ago 
suggests that necessity, as an excuse, “may conceivably be accepted in 
international law only on condition that it is absolutely of an exceptional 
nature.”25  However, in the report, military necessity is referred to as its own 
form of necessity, arising out of state responsibility.  According to Mr Ago, and 
the UN, military necessity:  
“constitutes the ratio, the raison d’être, of certain fundamental rules of the law of war 
and neutrality, namely, those which, in derogation of principles of peacetime law, confer 
on a belligerent State the legal right to resort, as against the enemy and its nationals … to 
acts which peacetime law would forbid.” 
Through the language chosen by the UN, it can be understood that military 
necessity, while accepted, as a legitimate exercise of a state’s sovereign right, 
should also only be considered when other options before a state have failed.  
 
 
                                                        
25 R Ago, Addendum - Eighth report on State responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special 
Rapporteur - the internationally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility 
YILC (1980) II(1) At 19. 
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D. International Court of Justice 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 26  the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provided a useful 
determination on the principle of military necessity in international law. This 
determination supports the Geneva Conventions concept of restricting military 
action where the civilian population would be put at significant risk. The ICJ 
determined that “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must 
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between 
civilian and military targets.”27 The ICJ continued “it is prohibited to cause 
unnecessary suffering to non combatants.”28 A pronouncement such as this 
provides a clear indication of an international court’s opinion on how judgments 
around military necessity are to be made. It gives us insight into how tribunals 
will interpret the treaty law of the Hague Treaties and the Geneva Conventions, 
when used as a defence by individuals seeking to justify action as a military 
necessity. 
 
IV. MILITARY NECESSITY AND ACTION 
Significant discussion and focus is placed upon the theoretical and legal 
interpretation of military necessity with further contemplation about possible 
applications of military necessity.  Military necessity operates as both a 
restrictive, and permissive condition of IHL.  The following section will seek to 
illustrate what military necessity looks like when it is used as a justification for 
action in recent examples of armed conflict. It will examine situations that 
required the balancing exercise to determine whether military necessity existed 
in order to justify intervention through military means.  
 
Primary focus will be placed upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO’s) operations during in the former Yugoslavia, also known as the Kosovo 
crisis.  The criterion of military necessity is used as the bench mark determining 
whether action is justifiable, and this will be considered against what actions 
                                                        
26 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion of 8 July 1996. 
27 Ibid at 97. 
28 Ibid. 
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NATO undertook, and whether these actions arguably met the military necessity 
threshold.  This section will ask to what extent does territorial application apply 
to military necessity, and how close to a theatre of operation can an attack that is 
justified as militarily necessary be conducted.   Furthermore, it is important to 
consider the possibility that whatever action is taken by military commanders is 
balanced between overall military objectives, and how these objectives may 
influence a decision based on a determination of military necessity. 
 
Military necessity will also be considered in light of certain methods of combat, 
and the particular application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) or ‘drones’ to 
conduct warfare, and the decision-making process that must be, or should be, 
involved when using UAV’s to complete military objectives.  
 
E. American Intervention 
As mentioned, NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo Crisis 
provides an effective example of military necessity in a recent context.  However, 
before discussing military necessity’s application during the Kosovo Crisis, it is 
important to briefly discuss the American position on intervention, as America 
played a vital role in terms of NATO’s ability to effectively intervene during the 
Kosovo Crisis and provide support.  Military intervention is important in the 
context of military necessity because military necessity is arguably one of the 
key factors when determining whether to conduct a military operation 
 
President George W. Bush, following the 9/11 attacks conducted operations in 
attempt to reassert American power and demonstrate its willingness to use such 
power.  Karl Eikenberry argues that there are four factors involved when 
influencing the decision of whether military intervention should occur.   He 
argues that firstly “since the end of the Cold War, the US has found it difficult to 
define a coherent and consistent international security strategy.”29  This lack of a 
coherent strategy is based on a large number of competing interests demanding 
considerations that often involve serious financial consequences.  This 
                                                        
29 K Eikenberry “The American Calculus of Military Intervention”, Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, (2014) vol 56 no 3, at 264. 
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influences the second consideration, that “Americans view the serious domestic 
fiscal and political problems [of the US] … as related in part to its involvement in 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.”30 The third factor is that there is “Scepticism 
regarding the use of force.”31  Finally, American military intervention, and 
whether or not it occurs, depends upon “the constitutional argument within the 
US government over the war-making authority[.]”32  He argues that the primary 
lesson American learnt from involvement in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is one 
of caution and skepticism, suggesting America in the future should follow the 
dictum, “look before you leap.”33  With this argument in mind, it is now 
necessary to turn to analysing one of America’s involvement through NATO 
during the Kosovo Crisis.  
 
F. NATO and the Kosovo Crisis 
In 1999 NATO launched a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), for the purpose of ending the repression of Kosovo’s dominant 
ethnic Albanian population.  The campaign launched by NATO “pushed at the 
boundaries of international law in at least two important respects.”34  The 
decision to engage in large-scale military action, without the consent of the UN 
Security Council authorisation “raised significant doubts about the status of the 
law governing the use of force and the viability of [UN] primacy in matters of 
international peace and security.”35 However, the second important aspect is 
more significant for the purposes of the role that military necessity played 
during NATO’s campaign.  This is centered around “NATO’s high-altitude 
bombing campaign, conducted without a single NATO combat casualty but with 
significant civilian casualties within the FRY.36  The significant numbers of 
civilian casualties therefore requires an understanding of the purpose of NATO’s 
intervention and how its intervention was conducted. 
 
                                                        
30 Ibid at 265. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Above, n 29 at 266. 
33 Above, n 29 at 269. 





It must be remembered that military necessity primarily operates as a general 
principle of restraint.  Humanitarian considerations must come as secondary to 
the fact that “[m]ilitary necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, 
consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing 
the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and 
usages of war.”37 Therefore, military necessity can be seen as having “a 
restraining effect, since it imposes restrictive standard on the exercise of 
warfare: a belligerent must refrain from employing any kind or degree of 
violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes.”38 Allowing 
derogation from international norms is a basic aspect of military necessity, 
codified under Article 35 of AP I.  Article 35(1) states that during an armed 
conflict, “the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited.”  This is supported by Article 35(2) that prohibits the 
use of weapons including projectiles and material and methods of warfare “of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” The requirements 
of AP I and II are of vital importance and are helpful when seeking to determine 
whether NATO actions during the Kosovo crisis could be determined militarily 
necessary.  
 
NATO airstrikes were undertaken as a way to end the ethnic cleansing taking 
place in Kosovo.  Whether air strikes were the most effective means of 
intervention remains the subject of debate.  As a result of how the genocide was 
taking place, showed that “[s]ome elements … were clearly open to air attack, 
others, including many of the ground operation units,  much less … so.”39 
However, it was argued that the “basic reasoning behind the decision to adopt 
air strikes as a sole tactical method seems to have been founded upon a desire … 
to minimize NATO causalities.”40 Additionally, air strikes provided an effective 
                                                        
37 Art 14, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber 
Code), 1863. 
38 G Venturini “Necessity in the Law of Armed Conflict and in International Criminal Law” (2010) 
41 NYIL 45 at 48. 




means of achieving military objectives without a protracted commitment of 
ground forces.   
 
The choice by NATO to use air strikes to conduct its operations against Serbian 
forces is significant in terms of military necessity requirements.  Additional 
Protocols I and II of 1977 highlight important factors to be considered when 
determining whether NATO’s operations met the threshold of being militarily 
necessary.   For example, Article 48 states: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. 
During the air strike campaign a number of targets were identified as civilian 
objects, and it was argued that NATO was in clear violation of Article 48.  
 
G. Military Necessity: NATO’s intervention 
One of the key issues faced by NATO during its bombing campaign was trying to 
properly distinguish between military and civilian targets.  Proximity to a 
military target is crucial for determining whether an attack could be justified as 
coming within the requirements of military necessity.  A number of occasions 
during NATO’s bombing campaign demonstrated that collateral damage during 
an operation occurred, but whether that damage fell outside the scope of 
military necessity is debatable.  
 
According to Human Rights Watch, NATO’s bombs killed between 500 and 1800 
civilians, while wounding thousands more civilians.41  During NATO’s attack, 
they “hit not only military forces and facilities, but also destroyed Yugoslavia’s 
entire public infrastructure, inflicting an estimated $4 billion of damage on 
bridges, highways, railroads, civilian airports, oil refineries, factories, 
construction equipment … hospitals, schools … houses … and hundreds of acres 
                                                        
41 Human Rights Watch World Report “New Figures on Civilian Deaths in Kosovo War” (7 
February 2000) <www.hrw.org/hrw/press/2000/02/nato207/htm>. 
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of forest.”42 Such collateral damage would appear that NATO violated very basic 
elements of IHL not to target or attack civilians.  To what extent then, could 
these attacks be justified by military necessity?  The strikes, which resulted in 
civilian deaths and injuries were carried out by aircraft which “dropped more 
than 38,000 sorties 15,000 feet about the ground to protect its airplanes and 
pilots.”43  This method of conducting military operations, according to Amnesty 
International, “made full adherence to international humanitarian law virtually 
impossible.”44   
 
The NATO air campaign’s purpose was clear, primarily it was “to weaken Serb 
military capabilities, both strategically and tactically.”45 From the strategic point 
of view, strikes targeted clear military objectives including artillery and military 
field headquarters, which had an immediate effect in the disruption of Serbian 
ethnic cleansing.  In conjunction with the strategic strikes, more tactical 
objectives included government ministries and refineries, which, while not 
immediately offering direct military advantages, caused disruption to the 
greater Serbian military organisation.  In his article on the proportionality of 
NATO’s campaign against Yugoslavia Fenrick states that the “choice of targets…. 
must be viewed within the content of contemporary theories for the use of 
aerospace power.”46  One such theory is the ‘Five Strategic Rings’ theory, put 
forward by Colon John A. Warden, USAF.  This theory suggests that five rings 
“represent a different facet of a nation’s society, [and the theory] lays the 
foundation for the notion of targeting national infrastructure to attack the 
enemy from the ‘inside out’[.]”47 This approach should be viewed with caution 
because of the inherent risk that objects that offer no definite military advantage 
are targeted or damaged during an attack.  This theory arguably does not fit the 
requirements of IHL because even though “[p]roponents of the … theory do not 
                                                        
42 M Cohen “NATO Bombing of Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention or Crime Against Humanity?” 
[2002] 79 IJSL at 80. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Amnesty International “NATO violations of the laws of war during Operation Allied Force must 
be investigated”, (25 July 2000) <www.amnesty.org/news/2000/4/002500.htm>. 
45 W.J. Fenrick “Targeting and Proportionality during NATO Bombing Campaign against 
Yugoslavia” [2001] 12 EJIL 489 at 490. 
46 Ibid at 491. 
47 Ibid. 
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suggest that the enemy civilian population should be attacked … they do believe 
that one of the objectives in war-fighting is to affect adversely civilian support 
for the enemy war effort.”48  This statement also stands in stark opposition to 
the general principles of IHL including Article 51 of AP I.  Specifically, Article 
51(2) states that “[t]he civilian population … shall not be the object of attack.  
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population are prohibited.”  Article 51 also provides for the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks where there is no direct military objective 
and where a military attack could harm military and civilian objects without 
distinction. 
 
While Article 51 prohibits attacks on civilians prime facie, but Article 52 
acknowledges that civilian objectives may become militarised if such objects can 
contribute to military action. In this way military necessity acts as “a limiting 
factor … [by] implicitly recogni[sing] the lawful nature of weapons that cause 
militarily necessary suffering.”49 Following Schmitt, it could be argued that 
NATO action during its bombing campaign, despite resulting civilian casualties, 
was justified because of military necessity, because the need to destablise the 
Serbian military’s ability to effectively conduct operations. 
 
NATO’s military objectives were outlined following the end of its campaign in 
Yugoslavia, these objectives demonstrate the extent to which military necessity 
was used to justify NATO intervention.  NATO’s key objectives during the 
campaign were to “[d]emonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to 
Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans … [d]eter Milosevic from continuing and 
escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and … reverse his ethnic cleansing; 
and [d]amage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo.”50 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) appears to support NATO 
action.  The ICTY “emphasized that the prohibition on terrorizing a civilian 
                                                        
48 Ibid. 
49 M N Schmitt “Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving 
the Delicate Balance” [2010] 50 VJIL 795 at 802. 
50 Cohen and Shelton “Joint Statement on Kosovo After Action Review in the US Mission to 
NATO” Security Issues Digest, (14 October 1999) at 6. 
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population applies only when the operation was designed to cause terror.”51 
While in this context the ICTY was determining whether the actions of Serbian 
forces were specifically designed to cause terror to the civilian population, it is 
possible to assume that NATO’s actions were, despite causing terror to the 
civilian population, were not designed to cause terror. 
 
Aaron Schwabach, writing during NATO’s operations, questioned the legality of 
NATO’s bombing.  While NATO’s primary justification for intervention was to 
prevent genocide, Schwabach draws attention to the fact that the UN Charter 
“contains no provision allowing the use of force to prevent such atrocities.”52 
Although he does not refer to military necessity as a justification for military 
intervention, Schwabach is extremely critical of NATO action, going so far to 
state that it “does not appear that there is currently a customary international 
law norm permitting the use of force by states to prevent other states from 
killing or expelling their own populations.”53 However, consequences for NATO’s 
actions were arguably less severe than Serbia’s.  
 
H. The territorial application of military necessity  
A proper assessment of military objectives is necessary before an operation is 
conducted.   The war on terror, currently being fought against various terrorist 
groups, led by the United States, provides another example of military necessity 
in operation.   A recent development in armed conflict is the use of UAVs to 
complete surgical strikes against specific targets.   The use of UAVs has raised 
questions about the legality of such weapons.  In terms of military necessity, as 
was demonstrated during the Kosovo Crisis, NATO was operating within a 
defined territory, and its targets were within that territory.  However, the 
present conflict has shown that military targets are often spread throughout a 
large area, and are not fixed. 
 
                                                        
51 Above, n 49 at 816. 
52 A Schwabach “The Legality of the NATO Bombing Operation in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia [1999] 11 Pace Int’l L Rev 405 at 416. 
53 Ibid at 418. 
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Ryan Vogel presents a number of issues that are raised when employing the use 
of UAVs.   Regardless of whether an attack meets proportionality, necessity and 
humanity requirements of IHL, the following issues present themselves as 
recurring throughout the use of UAVs.  Vogel asks if it matters whether “the host 
government consents to the strike, expressly opposes the strike, or is silent on 
the matter?”54  This raises the further question of whether the justification of 
military necessity has such wide-ranging applicability that an operation could be 
conducted well outside any defined theatre of operation.  He continues by asking 
if a strike is still considered legal under IHL “if the strike takes place within the 
recognized battlefield of Afghanistan, the border region of Pakistan, the 
ungoverned spaces of Somalia; or the terrorist havens of Yemen?”55 These 
questions result from the nature of the armed conflict that the United States and 
its allies find itself in.  
 
The Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) “provides the authority 
for the use of military force [but] offers a great deal of ambiguity for its 
application.”56 This ambiguity is necessary for the current conflict because of the 
geographical expansiveness of the conflict zone, but critics of the United States 
operations argue “targeting operations conducted outside the geographical 
battlefield do not fall under the law of armed conflict at all, but under the 
criminal law.”57 Harold Koh, former Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in 
a 2010 speech, defended and justified the United States’ use of drone strikes and 
related operations as meeting the requirements of IHL.  Koh stated “whether a 
particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon 
considerations specific to each case.”58  The principle of proportionality was 
used as an example because it “prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
                                                        
54 R J Vogel “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict” [2010] 39 Denv J INT’L & POL ’Y 101 
at 106. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Above, n 54 at 108. 
57 Above, n 54 at 109. 
58 H H Koh “The Obama Administration and International Law” Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law, Washington DC, 25 March 2010. 
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direct military advantage anticipated.”59  Koh’s choice of examples clearly shows 
that military necessity remains at the forefront of any determination to launch a 
drone strike.  Whether an individual will be targeted, regardless of location “will 
depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the 
imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the 
willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses.”60  
Perhaps somewhat dangerously in terms of IHL, the United States “may conduct 
… strikes as long as the individuals … are lawfully targetable as belligerents or 
civilians who have forfeited their protected status [as defined under the Hague 
Convention IV].”61 
 
It must be remembered that in any operation, Article 52 of AP I requires that a 
target must offer “a definite military advantage.”62 Furthermore, the United 
States Army field manual on the law of war that military necessity is defined as 
the “principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law 
which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as 
soon as possible.”63  Whether drone strikes meet the military necessity 
requirements has been described as a relatively easy question to answer.   
Drones prove invaluable to military operations because of “their ability to find 
and identify targeted persons and reach into territory that ground forces cannot 
enter, either for military or political reasons.”64 This is because often, enemy 
forces will only present themselves for short periods of time, and the ability to 
take action is often limited.  It seems that under current analysis, the territorial 
requirements of military necessity when conducting operations is a fluid 
consideration that gives way to the greater objective of whether an operation 
will offer a definite military advantage for the accomplishment of a military goal, 
regardless of that goals location.  
 
                                                        
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Above, n 54 at 109 - 110. 
62 Art 52(2) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 1977. 
63 United States Department of Army, Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare 14 (2005) at 
164. 
64 Above, n 54 at 115. 
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Distinguishing between a civilian and military objective presents itself as a 
significant issue for drone strikes, and the ability for the operators of drones to 
comply with IHL. For example, a person’s house may be civilian in status “but 
when the home is used to house belligerents …. plan or conduct attacks … or any 
number of other activities that make an effective contribution the war effort, 
that home … changes in such a way that it forfeits its protected civilian status 
and becomes a military objective.”65At all times though, regardless of the target 
and its location, military necessity considerations remain at the forefront of any 
decision. 
 
V. MILITARY NECESSITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 Military necessity acts as an important balancing principle when determining 
whether a military operation should be conducted.  However, after an operation 
is completed, and the armed conflict is at an end, the opportunity arises for 
greater scrutiny and investigation of the actions that took place during the 
armed conflict.  Breaches of IHL during armed conflicts often result in war 
crimes charges.  International criminal law imposes liability upon individuals 
who have allegedly breached fundamental principles of IHL.   
 
Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), War crimes are 
defined under Article 8 and include “[w]ilfull killing and [e]xtensive destruction 
and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly[.]”66 However, prior to the entry into force of the ICC 
statute, various criminal tribunals were required to interpret and determine the 
legality of individual actions in times of war.  Military necessity, as a defence, 
was codified under Article 6 of the Nuremburg Statute.  Article 6(b) provided 
that war crimes included “plunder of public and private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity.”67 This pronouncement, in the context of post World War Two, is 
                                                        
65 Above, n 54 at 122. 
66 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force 1 July 2002), art 2(a)(i) 
and (iv). 
67 Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution 
and punishment of the major war criminal of the European Axis (“London Agreement), 8 August 
1945, art 6(b). 
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equally applicable to situations of armed conflict today.   Military necessity, to be 
successful as defence, is strictly applied and will only succeed, where it can be 
shown that military necessity, as understood by IHL, demanded a certain action 
or response to a situation.  
 
I. The Nuremberg Trials 
The Nuremberg Trials provided an opportunity for the Military Tribunal 
presiding to determine pleas of military necessity for alleged war crimes 
committed during World War II. 
 
In order to determine to what extent military necessity has been used as a 
defence under IHL at these tribunals, it is important to analyse examples of 
where this defence has been pleaded. Guidance on military necessity’s usage at 
ICL can be found under Article 6(b) of the Nuremburg Statute.68 The Statute 
provided that war crimes include “plunder of public and private property, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity.”69 In contrast, the military tribunals did not accept necessity 
as a defence in cases involving the summary execution of prisoners of war70, the 
murder or deportation of civilians71, the compulsory recruitment of labour from 
occupied territory72, or the seizure of property or goods beyond that which is 
necessary for the use of the army of occupation73. These cases highlight the 
clear, but strict, parameters of the application of military necessity under ICL, 
and the extent to which tribunals will accept it as a defence. 
 
The United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg accepted military necessity as 
a defence at the trial of the German General Lothar Rendulić.  During the German 
                                                        
68 Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution 
and punishment of the major war criminal of the European Axis (“London Agreement), 8 August 
1945. 
69 Ibid, Art 6(b). 
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HMSO 1947-1949, Vol. III (1948) at 59. 
71 Trial of Heinz Eck and Four Others (The Pelus Trial), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
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 22
Army’s retreat through Norway, Rendulić engaged in ‘scorched earth’ tactics in 
an attempt to slow down the advance of the Russian army that was believed to 
be behind Rendulić.  After raising this as justification for his actions, the Tribunal 
accepted that “[t]he destructions of public and private property by retreating 
military forces which would give aid and comfort to the enemy, may constitute a 
situation coming within the exceptions contained in Article 23(g) [of the Hague 
Regulations of 1907]”.74 Furthermore, the Tribunal held, that as a result of the 
nature of warfare holding a number of uncertainties including “the numerical 
strength of the enemy, the quality of his equipment … and the uncertainty of [an 
enemies] intentions.”75  The Tribunal followed by stating that as a result of the 
Rendulić’s decision to carry out the ‘scorched earth’ policy was done following 
an assessment of the conditions as they appeared to Rendulić at the time.  
Furthermore, relying upon this Rendulić “could honestly conclude that urgent 
military necessity warranted the decision made, holding that his decisions were 
justified based on information in his hands at that time.”76 
 
After hearing evidence, the Tribunal ultimately rule that the evidence showed 
that military necessity did not actually exist.  However, “Rendulić’s genuinely 
perceived danger of an enemy attack … should not be second-guessed simply 
because the full facts as they had become subsequently available contradicted … 
his original perception about the danger.”77 When considering a war crime, and 
in cases concerning individual criminal responsibility under ICL, “attention 
shifts from objective standards [such as the proportionality test] to subjective 
criteria (‘the conditions as they appeared to the defendant at the time’)”78   
 
In addition to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia represents one 
of the main reference points for determining individual criminal responsibility 
for violations of IHL today.  Hayashi asserts that where a defendant pleads 
                                                        
74 Above, n 38 at 66. 
75 Above, n 73 at 66-67.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Hostage, 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control 
Council Law No. 10 at 1297, in above, n 17 at 95. 
78 Above, n 38 at 66. 
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military necessity, “the challenges the notion that the crime was committed at 
all.”79 
 
The subjective criteria referred to by the ICTY is an important element to 
consider, and emphasises the onus upon military commanders during the 
decision-making process.  Furthermore, “[w]here the absence of military 
necessity is an element of a war crime, the onus rests with the prosecution to 
show this absence.”80  When asked to determine to what extent damage to 
property constituted a war crime, the ICTY’s Trial Chamber held that to 
“constitute a grave breach, the destruction unjustified by military necessity must 
be extensive, unlawful and wanton.” 
 
In The Prosecutor v Thiomir Blaškić81 (the Blaškić case), following on appeal from 
the original Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY declared that 
“there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of civilians in customary 
international law.”82 This followed an earlier ruling from the Trial Chamber 
which held that attacks against civilians or civilian objects would only be 
prohibited if not justified by military necessity.83 In another case, concerning the 
bombardment of the town of Dubrovnik, the ICTY held that “military necessity 
may be … defined  … with reference to the widely acknowledge definition of 
military objectives in Article 52 of [AP I.]”84  
 
J. The ICTY and NATO  
The ICTY was established to prosecute war crimes committed by Yugoslav 
forces.  There were calls for action to be taken against NATO for its action during 
the campaign.  However, the Prosecutor for the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte “stated 
that she had decided not to open a criminal investigation into any aspect of 
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NATO’s 1999 air campaign against the [FRY].”85  One of the main reasons to 
investigate NATO’s actions would have been to examine civilian casualties 
caused by NATO bombing.  It is argued that the decision not to prosecute was 
“tantamount to a judgment of not guilty.”86  This decision was seen as highly 
controversial, especially when read in light of Article 18 of the ICTY Statute 
states that the “Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis 
of information obtained from any source[.]  … The Prosecutor shall assess the 
information received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to 
proceed.87  In contrast to the number of prosecutions against the Yugoslav forces 
and government officials, an investigation into NATO actions was deemed 
unnecessary because its actions arguably adhered to IHL principles.  
 
K. NATO and Breaches of IHL 
However, this finding that NATO acted in accordance with IHL is disputed.  
Dispute centered around “the methods and policies utilized by NATO forces 
during the bombing, [and specifically] NATO’s … calculus of military advantage 
versus civilian casualty[.]”88 Amnesty International (AI) highlighted a number of 
occasions where it is alleged that NATO violated IHL.  On available evidence, AI 
believed that “whatever their intentions -- NATO forces did commit serious 
violations of the laws of war leading in a number of cases to the unlawful killings 
of civilians.”89 While AI, perhaps over optimistically suggests that because a 
number of member states contributed forces to the NATO operation, “each 
NATO member may incur responsibility for the military actions carried out 
under the NATO aegis.”90  
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Perhaps one of the most noted alleged violations committed by NATO is the 
attack on the Grdelica railroad bridge.  NATO “admitted that its aircraft had 
bombed the bridge and hit the train, but said that the target had been the bridge 
itself and that the train had been hit accidentally.”91 NATO justified the attack, 
which resulted in civilian casualties, because the mission was to destroy the 
bridge.   The final report into the incident concluded “the passenger train was 
not deliberately targeted.”92  Critics of the Grdelica bridge incident strongly 
argue that NATO breached IHL, by failing to follow the fundamental rule of 
distinguishing between military objectives and civilians.  However, NATO 
reasoning after the incident supports the position that, unlike Yugoslav forces, 
the attack on civilians was unintentional, even if it was could be found that 
military necessity did not exist. 
 
L. The ICJ on Military Necessity 
Another advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides 
further clarity into military necessity’s interpretation under IHL.   The ICJ, when 
considering the route of the wall built by Israel in the occupied territory 
examined “certain provisions of the applicable [IHL] enabling account to be 
taken in certain circumstances of military exigencies[.]”93  For example, article 
49(2) of Geneva Convention IV, in reference to an occupying force holds that an 
occupying force may “undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if … 
imperative military reasons so demand.”94 In light of the Israeli Defence Force’s 
construction of the wall, the ICJ found that it could not be justified on the basis of 
the “absolute necessity of military operations.”95  The ICJ continued to state that 
the construction of a wall along the route chosen was not “the only means to 
safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as 
justification for that construction.” Here, the ICJ’s advisory opinion leaves room 
for other grounds of justification, including state necessity, but for the purposes 
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of military necessity, it shows that where other options may be available to a 
state to justify a course of action, those should be pursued before turning to 
military necessity.   
 
M. Military Necessity under Non International Armed Conflict 
Military necessity is often associated, and has most commonly been used in 
relation to International Armed Conflicts.  However, it also operates as a 
principle of the law of conflict in Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC). In 
contrast to International Armed Conflict, under the law of NIAC “military 
necessity is hidden behind different language.”96 During a NIAC confrontation, 
the same permissive and restrictive conditions of military necessity apply.  AP II 
of the Geneva Convention deals specifically with the rules relating to the 
protection of victims of NIAC.  The most emphatic statements on military 
necessary in AP II comes under Article 17, which prohibits the forced movement 
of civilians “unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military 
reasons so demand.”97  The language of article 17 is similar to that contained in 
other international legal instruments, including AP I.    
 
Difficulty arises, however, out of the very nature of NIAC.  Conflicts are not 
usually symmetrical.  Combatants are not two states, but usually the state, 
versus an insurgent group, of vastly lesser resources and military capability to 
the government it is fighting.  As a result, it becomes vital that principles such as 
proportionality and distinction are properly adhered to.   However, unlike the 
rules of IHL which are binding upon states, under NIAC there are no binding 
rules that “define the concept of military objective nor the notion of military 
advantage, which stem from military necessity[.]”98 As a result of the different 
nature of the conflict under NIAC, it is suggested that “great caution should be 
exercised when applying the principle of military necessity.”99 This is because of 
the great disparity between the parties to the conflict, and it would be 
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inappropriate to apply the same standard, either at IHL or ICL to parties with 
vastly different training, organisational structures, and resources. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Military necessity is one of the cornerstone principles of IHL.  It has played a 
central role in the conduct of warfare throughout the development of modern 
armed conflict, beginning with the American Civil War, and continuing 
throughout conflicts until today.  The place and importance of military necessity 
has been interpreted by a number of authors and international tribunals as a 
principle that is both permissive and restrictive in what military commanders 
may or may not do during an armed conflict.  Case law has shown what 
conditions need to exist for a defence of military necessity to be successfully 
pleaded, specifically the Nuremberg Tribunals and the ICTY have examined 
individual actions during armed conflict in relation to specific war crimes and 
offences under ICL. Military necessity is equally an important consideration 
under international treaty law, working to protect civilians, non-combatants, 
buildings and property.  IHL and ICL operate together to ensure armed conflicts 
are conducted according to the law, and provide recourse against those who fail 
to comply with that law.  
 
During the Kosovo Crisis, military necessity was used to justify a range of actions 
taken by NATO to intervene in Yugoslavia in order to prevent a greater 
humanitarian crisis.   Although controversial, and with much criticism, because 
no individual from the NATO alliance has been prosecuted before the ICTY, it is 
implied that NATO’s actions were seen as justifiable and necessary under IHL. 
 
Military necessity’s future importance ooks certain and its continued use will 
play an important role in armed conflicts throughout the world in the 21st 
century.  As already demonstrated by the United States use of drone warfare, 
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